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Abstract
We consider a society with informed individuals (adults) and naive individuals (children).
Adults are altruistic towards their own children and possess information that allows to better
predict the behavior of other adults. Children benet from adopting behaviors that conform
to the social norm determined by aggregate adult behavior, but, lacking accurate information,
have to rely on the observed behavior of their adult parent to infer the norm. We show that
this causes a signaling distortion in adult behavior. Compared to the benchmark case of no
signaling, parents have a higher propensity to adopt attitudes that encourage their children
to behave in a socially safe way, i.e. the way which would be optimal under maximum
uncertainty about the prevailing social norm. This distortion is dierent in nature from
the typical distortion due to a conict of interest between sender and receiver in standard
signaling games. The norm-signaling bias is self-reinforcing and might lead both to (Pareto)
superior and inferior outcomes relative to the case of no signaling. We discuss applications
to sexual attitudes, collective reputation, and trust.
JEL codes: C72, D83, D80, Z13. Keywords: Signaling, Norms, Strategic Uncer-
tainty, Complementarities, Coordination Games, Socialization.
1 Introduction
Cultural anthropologists dene the culture of a society as \...whatever one has to know or believe
in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members" (Goodenough, 1957). Information
about what to expect from others is extremely valuable in social interactions. The behavior
and attitudes of experienced individuals (parents, teachers, mentors) are often motivated by
the need to teach what is socially acceptable to more naive members of a society (children,
pupils, prot eg ees). For example, a school for children aged 3-18 in Cambridge, UK, has recently
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1introduced a policy where pupils are let o for minor misdemeanors if they come up with quick
and clever excuses. The head teacher reportedly justied the policy by arguing that \it's a great
lesson of life to talk your way out of a tight corner in a very short period of time."1
Less controversially, many readers will be familiar with the dilemmas of PhD student training.
Should the advisor set high standards in order to encourage a student to invest in technical skills?
Or should he \go easy" on the student? The answer to this question partly depends on the norms
within a eld. Investing in technical skills may be crucial for the student's career prospects if
other senior academics (referees, reviewers, journal editors) happen to have high standards.
Setting low standards may mislead the student into thinking that technical sophistication is not
required. In a similar vein, many parents face the problem of which attitude to take towards
particular forms of behavior such as pre-marital sex and, more generally, sexual promiscuity. A
relaxed attitude by one's parent signals that society is relaxed about sex issues, and may thus
encourage the child to try sex before marriage.
All the above examples share the common feature that the behavior of an \experienced"
individual conveys information to a \naive" individual about social norms. In this paper, we
look at this problem from a strategic viewpoint. We consider a setting with a continuum of
informed players (adults) and naive players (children). Each adult has altruistic motives toward
his own child. Adults face a binary choice between a high action (high academic standards,
conservative attitude toward sex) and a low action (low standards, liberal attitude). An adult's
direct payo depends on the aggregate behavior of other informed players { i.e. the social norm
{ and on a state of nature. Children also face a binary choice (whether to invest in skills, whether
to engage in pre-marital sex). The payo from either choice depends on the social norm set by
aggregate adult behavior.
We assume that adults observe private but correlated signals about the state of nature and
that aggregate behavior is not directly observable. Adults' private information allows them to
form accurate beliefs about the social norm. Children observe the behavior of their own parent
and draw inferences about the norm set by adults.
Our main result is that, relative to the benchmark case where children directly observe the
social norm, parent-child signaling causes a distortion in adult behavior. We call this distortion
the norm-signaling bias. Intuitively, if the child knew the norm, then each adult could simply
take the action that maximizes his own expected utility. By converse, with naive children, adults
have to take into account the fact that their behavior might mislead their child into adopting
a suboptimal behavior. The norm-signaling bias is thus dierent in nature from the standard
1Details can be obtained at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-cambridgeshire-20397480.
2signaling distortion due to a conict of interests between sender and receiver. Quite the opposite,
it would not arise if adults did not care about their children's welfare.
Our setting allows to uniquely characterize the properties of the norm-signaling bias. We
show that adults always distort their behavior in a way that encourages their child to take the
socially safe choice. This is the action that would be optimal for the child under maximum
strategic uncertainty.2 The intuition is as follows. Although all adults possess precise informa-
tion that in principle may help to predict the behavior of others, the marginal adult (i.e., who
is indierent between the two actions) faces maximum strategic uncertainty: He believes either
action to be majoritarian with the same probability. He thus distorts his behavior to encourage
his child to choose the action that he (the marginal adult) believes to be optimal, i.e. the so-
cially safe choice. As it is usual in economics, what happens at the margin determines overall
behavior. As a result, social norms will be partly shaped by the adults' desire to shelter their
child from the potential costs of miscoordination. This may explain for instance why parents
often adopt behaviors aimed at promoting a certain degree of \caution" in their children. If
abstaining from pre-marital sex is optimal when one is uncertain about the social norm, parents
will have a high propensity to take a conservative attitude on sex issues. A more direct example
is provided by parental attempts to modify their own manner of speech (e.g. by smoothing
their accent) in the hope of encouraging their children to speak with a more \neutral" accent
(e.g. the Queen's English). The virtue of a neutral accent is that it is fairly understandable
independently of whether one is used to a particular regional accent or not.
While the direction of the norm-signaling bias depends on the child's socially safe choice, its
magnitude is determined by the strength of what we call oblique complementarities. These can
be dened as the pressure faced by children to conform to the social norm set by aggregate adult
behavior. In the sex attitudes example, this reects the cost of being ostracized by conservative
adults for having premarital sex. Stronger oblique complementarities increase the value to the
child of the information conveyed by parental behavior. In turn, this increases the adult's
incentive to distort his behavior.
The presence of oblique complementarities makes the norm-signaling bias self-reinforcing,
since the very act of signaling determines the nature of what is being signaled. Parents who
adopt a certain behavior (e.g. a conservative attitude) to signal that that particular behavior is
the norm make the norm even more pervasive. In turn, this makes signaling more compelling.
2Our denition of socially safe choices is clearly strongly related to the concept of risk dominance in 22 games
(the importance of risk dominance is stressed by the results of Carlsson and van Damme, 1993, and Kandori,
Mailath, and Rob, 1993). Notice however that our point is slightly more subtle. Parents distort their behavior in
a way that induces their child to choose their \risk dominant" action.
3More generally, we show that signaling concerns dramatically aect the nature of the interaction
among informed players. For instance, the norm-signaling bias may induce them to behave as if
their actions were strategic complements even when, absent any signaling concerns, they would
be substitutes.
In order to gather a better understanding of the socio-economic implications of the norm-
signaling bias, we discuss three applications. The rst is our running example: Parents select
their attitude on sex issues and children choose whether to engage in pre-marital sex or not.
The second application considers collective reputation problems (Arrow, 1973, Coate and Loury,
1993, Moro, 2003, Fang and Norman, 2006, Saez-Mart  and Zenou, 2012). In a simplied version
of Coate's and Loury's (1993) model, we investigate under what conditions it is optimal for
parents to socialize their children to work hard. Following Adriani and Sonderegger (2009),
the third application looks at under what conditions parents choose to instil honesty into their
children.
In all three examples, the presence of a norm-signaling bias generates somewhat striking
predictions. In the example of attitudes toward sex, a parent may want to take a conservative
attitude on sex issues even if he has moderately liberal beliefs, i.e. even if he thinks that,
on balance, pre-marital sex is a good thing. Even more, the equilibrium is characterized by
hypocrisy: A conservative norm emerges even when all adults know that all other adults have
moderately liberal beliefs. In the problem of collective reputation we nd that { in environments
where access to education is particularly costly { parents may nd it optimal to give their children
a weak work norm even when incentives are designed to reward hard work. The third application
shows that parents may want to teach their children to be honest even when society appears
to encourage dishonesty (e.g., due to weak or corrupt governance). This outcome is however
possible only if the potential rewards from trusting others are suciently large. When this is
not the case, a \street culture" (Silverman, 2004) might instead emerge whereby individuals
engage in anti-social behavior even if crime does not pay.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review the relevant literature. In
Section 2 we present the baseline model. Section 3 provides a characterization of the norm-
signaling bias. Section 4 considers some natural extensions of the baseline model. Section 5
illustrates the eects of the bias in applications. In all these cases, we are generally able to
obtain unique predictions. In Section 6, however, we study two variants of the model that
necessarily generate multiple equilibria. In the rst, we look at what happens when children
mostly care about conforming to their peers (rather than to adults). In the second, we allow for
costless communication between adults and their children.
41.1 Related literature
Signaling models of culture/social norms have recently received much attention (see e.g. Bern-
heim, 1994, Fang, 2001, B enabou and Tirole, 2006, Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008, Daughety
and Reinganum, 2009). With few notable exceptions (see e.g. Sliwka 2006, Acemoglu and
Jackson, 2011), however, these models have restricted attention to situations where the sender
is concerned about signaling his own characteristics. By contrast, we consider the problem of
informed individuals who want to convey information about how they believe others are likely
to behave.
Closely related to our work are Hermalin (1998), Bernheim and Thomadsen (2005), Adriani
and Sonderegger (2009 and 2013) and B enabou and Tirole (2011). Hermalin (1998) considers a
setting where an informed leader distorts his eort to increase the eort exerted by his followers.
The distortion in his case is due to a conict of interest between leader and followers in the sense
that the leader wants each follower to exert higher eort than the follower would like. As we
argue below, the distortion we identify is not due to a conict of interests and, therefore, would
not arise in a standard \leading by example" model. A similar argument can be made for
B enabou and Tirole (2011) and Adriani and Sonderegger (2013). We discuss Bernheim and
Thomadsen (2005) and Adriani and Sonderegger (2009) in Sections 4 and 5.3, respectively.
From a more technical viewpoint, our model is related to the literature on binary action
global games (Carlsson and van Damme, 1993, Morris and Shin, 1998). A few papers in this
literature have analyzed, as we do, settings with both payo complementarities and information
externalities (Corsetti et al. 2004, Goldstein and Pauzner, 2004). This literature has however
mostly focused on nancial applications and thus lacks a crucial ingredient in our story, namely
intergenerational altruism.
2 The Baseline Model
Most of our results are driven by a single eect. For pedagogical purposes, we start o with an
extremely stylized setup that allows to isolate the main force at work from confounding eects.
These will be considered in the next section.
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of identical child-adult pairs, indexed by
i 2 [0;1], where each adult has exactly one child. Adult behavior is characterized by an action
a. Each adult may choose between a = 1 (high action) or a = 0 (low action). Adults move
simultaneously. The direct payo to an adult from the low action is zero. The direct payo from
the high action is given by the random variable  (the state of nature). We assume that the
5state of nature is uniformly drawn in the interval [ D;D]. However, parents do not perfectly
observe ; Each parent i only observes a private noisy signal i uniformly drawn in the interval
[   ; + ]. We will assume that  is positive but small.
In the advisor/advisee example, the advisor may choose whether to require high or low
standards. Whether requiring high standards is appropriate or not depends on the advisor's
personal assessment of the intrinsic characteristics of the eld, i, (e.g. whether it is a young
eld with abundant \low hanging fruits" that do not require much sophistication to be reaped
or it is a mature eld where sophistication is crucial).
Children also face a binary action problem. They can choose between a top action ( = 1)
and a bottom action ( = 0). In the advisor/advisee example, the action  can be interpreted
as investment in technical skills. The payo from the bottom action is again set equal to zero.
The payo from the top action depends on the share of adults who have chosen the high action,
x 2 [0;1],
C(x) = !(x   rC): (1)
Intuitively, it is worth investing in skills only if there are enough senior academics with high
standards, (i.e. only if their share is at least equal to rC). The parameter ! > 0 captures the
sensitivity of the child's payo to the behavior of adults. It is thus a measure of the strength of
oblique complementarities. The parameter rC determines whether it is worse to lack technical
sophistication when most people demand it or to be technically sophisticated when most people
do not require it.3 It is thus clearly related to the concept of risk dominance developed for 22
games,
Denition 1. Action  2 f0;1g is the socially safe choice if it is optimal for the child under
maximum uncertainty over adults' behavior (i.e. if it is optimal when x is uniform in [0;1]).
Notice that the top action is socially safe when rC < 1=2, while the low action is socially
safe when rC > 1=2. For rC = 1=2, the two actions have the same safety level.
We assume that adults are altruistic towards their children. However, in order to better
illustrate the dierences between our setting and a standard signaling game, we allow for the
possibility of a conict of interests between an adult and his child. In the advisor/advisee
example, the advisor may not fully internalize the advisee's cost of investing in technical skills.
We model this by assuming that the adult's intrinsic preference over the child's action is given
by CP(x) = C(x)+, where  2 R measures the conict of interests. A value of  equal to zero
means that incentives are perfectly aligned. A positive  implies that the parent wants his child
to choose the top action in situations where the child would prefer the bottom action (e.g. he
3The case where the child's payo also depends on  is addressed below, in section 4.
6does not fully internalizes the costs of the top action), while a negative  means that the parent
is biased against the top action. The role of  will be particularly relevant in section 6.2 where
we discuss the possibility of parent-child communication via cheap-talk.
Bottom action Top action
Low action 0 C(x) + 
High action   + [C(x) + ]
Table 1: Total parental utility (bold symbols reect parent's utility from the child's choice).
Table 1 shows an adult's total utility. More compactly, this can be expressed as
u(x;a;;)  a + [C(x) + ]: (2)
Information Structure and Timing
The timing is as follows.
Stage 0 Nature draws a realization of  2 [ D;D] and, for each adult i, draws a signal i 2
[   ; + ].
Stage 1 Each adult i observes i (but not ) and chooses action ai. All adults move simulta-
neously.
Stage 2 Each child i observes ai (but not i, , or x) and chooses action i.
Stage 3 Payos are realized.
Most of our results throughout the paper will be derived under the assumption that D is
large. While it is standard to assume uninformative priors in the global games literature, in
our case the prior also represents the children's ex-ante beliefs about the state of nature. The
implicit assumption is therefore that children have poor information about  (and thus about
x), beyond the information conveyed by parental behavior. This seems to be a reasonable way
to model young children, for whom the main source of information about the `adult world' is
usually the behavior of the adults who take care of them. It becomes less reasonable when we
consider more \sophisticated" children, who have independent access to multiple information
sources. For this reason, in Section 4 we extend the analysis to the case where children are able
to observe the aggregate behavior of adults (x) with some positive probability. This information
structure allows us to have meaningful comparative statics on the degree of sophistication of
children, while keeping the problem tractable.
73 Equilibrium characterization
We rst consider the benchmark case where children are able to perfectly observe x. In that
case, the child's equilibrium strategy consists in choosing the top action whenever x  rC and
is independent of parental behavior. We can thus treat the children's behavior as xed and
analyze the adults' problem in isolation. It is then clear that, with no signaling concerns, each
parent will choose the high action when i  0 and the low action for i < 0.4
Consider now the more interesting case where children do not observe x, but only the action
chosen by their own parent. This opens the door to the possibility of parent-child signaling.
Notice that parents do not directly observe the behavior of other adults. However, a parent's
private signal i is informative of the distribution of beliefs in the adult population. This gives
the parent an informational advantage over the child in predicting aggregate adult behavior (x).
Through his own behavior, each parent can convey information about i { and, thus, about x {
to his child.
Parent-child signaling aects the nature of strategic interactions among parents in a funda-
mental way. To see how this happens, let (a),  : f0;1g ! [0;1] denote the probability that
a child chooses the top action upon observing his parent choosing action a 2 f0;1g, and let
  (1)   (0). The value of  is determined in equilibrium and reects the extent to
which a parent's action aects his child's choice. In the case of informed children we have for
instance  = 0. In general, (2) implies that the parent's total net payo can be expressed as
af + [C(x) + ]g: (3)
We refer to (3) as the parent's inclusive payo. Dierentiating the term in graphs with respect
to x yields
d[u(1;(1);x;)   u(0;(0);x;)]
dx
= C0(x) = !: (4)
Whenever  > 0 a parent's incentive to choose the high action is (weakly) increasing in the
share of parents who choose the high action. Intuitively, by choosing the high action, parent
i aects the outcome associated with the choices of parent j's child. This increases parent
j's desire to choose the high action, in order to signal to his child that parent i is likely to
choose the high action. This stands in contrast with the case of informed children, where there
is no complementarity in adult behavior. The dierence between the two cases emerges even
though payos are exactly the same { the only dierence is in the information structure. The
presence of ! in (4) is an equilibrium feature, that emerges endogenously, motivated by the
child's equilibrium strategy.
4Throughout the paper, we use the convention that a parent who is indierent chooses the high action.
8By inducing a \spurious" complementarity in adults' behavior, norm signaling thus aects
the nature of social norms that will emerge in equilibrium. Having analyzed the core mechanism
at work in our model, we are now ready to give a full characterization of the equilibrium of the
game.
Proposition 1. For D suciently large, there exists a unique equilibrium where each parent i
chooses a = 1 if i exceeds a cuto  and chooses a = 0 otherwise. The equilibrium cuto  is
equal to
  + !
 
rC   1
2

:
Conict of Norm-signaling
interest bias
(5)
Each child chooses the top action ( = 1) if and only if he observes his parent choosing the
high action (a = 1).
Compared with the case of informed children, norm signaling signaling introduces additional
eects into the picture. When children are informed, adults have a cuto equal to zero. Ex-
pression (5) thus measures the distortion due to signaling. This has two components. The rst,
captured by the term , is the distortion due to the conict of interests. This distortion arises
because there are situations where the parent would like the child to choose one action, but the
child would prefer the other. The second component, the term !(rC  1=2), is what we call the
norm-signaling bias. Dierently from the rst term, the norm signaling bias does not reect
a misalignment of incentives and would arise even with  = 0. Rather, it reects the notion
that, through his own behavior, each parent reveals his beliefs about the behavior of others to
his child. Since parents are altruistic, they internalize the information externality that they
impose on their children. The end result is that the norm-signaling bias goes in the direction
of encouraging the child to select his socially safe choice. For instance, when the top action is
socially safe, the bias is negative. This is because parents are more inclined to select the high
action in order to induce their children to choose the top action. The reverse occurs when the
socially safe choice is the bottom action.
To see the intuition for this result, note that the marginal parent (i.e., the parent who
observes a i equal to the cuto) has a uniform posterior over x: He expects exactly half of the
parents to choose the high action and half to choose the low action. As far as he is concerned,
the child should therefore select the action that is optimal under maximum strategic uncertainty
(the socially safe choice). On the other hand, when children are naive, their behavior is fully
determined by their observation of parental behavior. Each adult is thus willing to tolerate a
movement of the cuto away from his private bliss point if this increases the chances that his
9child will adopt the socially safe action. The desire to induce children to \play it safe" (from a
social viewpoint) thus forces adults to distort their behavior.
Although the socially safe choice may determine the direction of the norm signaling bias, its
magnitude depends on the strength of oblique complementarities (!). Intuitively, the larger the
sensitivity of the child's payo to the behavior of other adults, the higher the propensity of the
parent to distort his behavior to shelter his child from costly mistakes.
An implication of Proposition 1 will play an important role in the discussion that follows.
Since, as we saw, signaling generates a \spurious" complementarity in parental behavior, the
norm-signaling bias is self-reinforcing. For instance, consider the case of no conict of interests
( = 0). When the top action is socially safe, parents who have observed a signal slightly
below zero choose to switch to the high action in order to induce their child to choose the top
action. By doing this, they make the high action more widespread { and thus the top action
more attractive { inducing parents with lower signals to switch as well. As a result, the very
act of signaling determines the nature of what is being signaled. Parents who follow the norm
to signal that that is the norm make the norm even more pervasive, thus making signaling more
compelling.
4 Mixed motives signaling, partially sophisticated children, hor-
izontal spillovers
We now extend the results of Proposition 1 in several directions. First, we allow the child's
payo to also depend on the state of nature. This implies that the parent's motives for signaling
are now mixed: Parental behavior conveys information both about the social norm and about
the state of nature. Second, we allow children to observe the norm with some probability. Third,
we allow for direct strategic interaction among adults and for pure externalities.
Mixed motives signaling In some cases, the child may also care directly about the state of
nature. For instance, in the advisor/advisee example, whether investing in skills is opportune
or not may also depends on the nature of the eld. To allow for this possibility, we thus assume
that the child's payo is given by
C(x;) = !(x   rC) + l; (6)
where the parameter l  0 measures the child's payo sensitivity to the state of nature.
Partially sophisticated children It is natural to assume that children may have direct access
to information sources beyond parental control. For instance, a PhD student may independently
10acquire some notion of the prevailing norms of the eld by attending seminars and conferences.
We model this by assuming that, with probability 1    the child is able to directly observe
aggregate behavior, x. With the complementary probability  2 [0;1] he is naive, i.e. he only
observes his parent's behavior. Adults do not know in advance what their child will observe,
but are aware that their actions will provide relevant information to their child with probability
.
Horizontal complementarity In some cases, adults may care directly about coordinating
with other adults. For instance, an academic may want to adopt standards that conform to the
standards of other senior academics in the eld. We thus assume that an adult's payo is given
by
P(x;) = v(x   rP) + ; (7)
where rP plays an analogous role to rC in the child's payo. The parameter v is the sensitivity of
the parent's net payo to changes in x, the share of adults selecting the high action. Consistent
with the literature on global games, we will predominantly concentrate on the case v  0
(strategic complementarity). However, in Section 5.3 we will discuss an application where v < 0,
so that parents' actions are strategic substitutes.
Pure externalities In some cases, the behavior of adults may generate pure externalities,
i.e. externalities with no direct consequence for strategic behavior, but with consequences on
aggregate welfare.5 We denote with e 2 R the social marginal benet of an adult taking the high
action. For instance, academics with high standards may generate research of higher quality, so
that all academics in the eld will benet (e > 0). On the other hand, they may also produce
work that is not easily accessible, so that the academic community will be worse o (e < 0).
Taking into account all these features, we can express an adult's total utility as
u(a;;x;) = aP(x;) + [C(x;) + ] + ex: (8)
Relative to the low action, the adult's inclusive net payo from the high action is now
P(x;) + [C(x;) + ]: (9)
where the presence of  in (9) reects the fact that an adult's behavior is now determinant
for his child's choice only if the child is naive. Compared to the baseline model, we need two
technical assumptions. The rst is mostly for analytical convenience and requires l < 1. In
5We consider pure externalities in the behavior of adults. It is however clear that nothing would change if we
were to consider pure externalities in the behavior of children.
11words, the direct impact of the state of nature on the parent's payo is always larger than its
indirect impact (i.e. through the child's payo).6 The second is more crucial,
A1 v + !  0.
Intuitively, this ensures that, once the child's reaction is taken into account, the inclusive payo
of each adult is supermodular. Notice that supermodularity of the adults' direct payo (i.e.
v  0) is not required. As a result, it will be possible to give a full characterization of the
equilibrium even in the presence of mild horizontal substitutability.
In the Appendix (see proof of Proposition 1) we show that, under l < 1 and A1, the
equilibrium behavior of children who do not directly observe x is uniquely determined. This
reduces to choosing the top (bottom) action whenever the parent chooses the high (low) action,
i.e.  = 1. Adults follow a threshold strategy with cuto
 =
v
 
rP   1
2

+ !
 
rC   1
2

  
1 + l
: (10)
We can obtain the cuto in the absence of signaling concerns, I, by setting  = 0 in (10),
I = v

rP  
1
2

: (11)
The distortion due to signaling is thus
   I =

1 + l

  + !

rC  
1
2

  lv

rP  
1
2

: (12)
The total distortion is now scaled by a factor =(1+l). Clearly enough, the less naive are chil-
dren, the lower the parents' incentives to distort their behavior for signaling purposes. Consider
now what happens as l increases. Intuitively, a higher l increases the importance for the child
of \getting  right". Signaling about the state of nature becomes more important relative to
norm-signaling. As a result, as l becomes larger, the parent wants to move his cuto away from
the child's socially safe choice and toward the optimal cuto when all that matters is the state
of nature (i.e.  = 0). This is evident by looking at the cuto expression (10). An increase
in l reduces the weight of the norm-signaling term !(rC   1=2). In general, this eect will
partially counteract the norm-signaling bias. There is however another eect. The weight of the
term v(rP   1=2) in (10) is also inversely related to l. Intuitively, as the child becomes more
exposed to the state of nature, it becomes also less crucial for the parent to conform to other
adults. As a result, the parent gives less importance to his own socially safe choice. When the
6If l  1, the equilibrium we characterize would still be an equilibrium, but proving uniqueness for all possible
parameters congurations is more complicated.
12parent's safe choice is misaligned with that of the child (e.g. rC < 1=2 and rP > 1=2) and there
is strong horizontal complementarity, this indirect eect outweighs the direct eect, so that the
norm-signaling bias is reinforced. As a result, higher sensitivity to the state of nature of the
child's payo may either increase or reduce the norm signaling bias depending on which eect
prevails.
Finally, to fully appreciate the welfare consequences of the norm-signaling bias, consider the
case of positive externalities (e > 0). With perfectly informed children, an adult's problem
would look like that depicted in Figure 1. Notice that, when i belongs to the \free rider"
portion of the line, the high action maximizes aggregate welfare even though the low action is
optimal for each adult independently of what other adults do. Clearly enough, with informed
children, no cooperation is possible when i falls in that portion of the line. This is because
the cuto, I, necessarily falls in the \coordination" portion and, therefore, i < I. This is
not necessarily true with naive children. If the top action is the socially safe choice and oblique
complementarities are suciently strong, the cuto, , will fall in the \free rider" segment. In
this case, the presence of a norm-signaling bias induces adults to cooperate for all realizations
of i   (the thick line in Figure 1). Hence, in this example, signaling boosts cooperation. We
will see in Section 5.3 an application where parents choose to provide a public good (pro-social
values) to signal to their children that a norm for honesty is widespread. That said, it is easy
to come up with parameter congurations where the reverse occurs, so that the norm-signaling
bias reduces cooperation.
The bottom line is that signaling forces adults to engage in behavior that would be otherwise
dominated. The intuition for this result is similar to that given in Bernheim and Thomadsen
(2005) for the case of self-signaling. There are, however, two important dierences. First, our
model generates \otherwise dominated" behavior as the only possible outcome { at least for
parameter values { whereas in Bernheim and Thomadsen (2005) dominated behavior may or
may not emerge depending on which equilibrium is selected. Second, our results impose precise
restrictions on the range of behaviors that could emerge in equilibrium. Adults may choose an
action that is \otherwise dominated" only when it encourages their child to select the socially
safe choice.
In order to gather a better understanding of the socio-economic implications of the norm-
signaling bias, we discuss now a few examples. In most cases, we will assume no conict of
interest to isolate the eect of norm-signaling. That said, it is not dicult to see how in each
case the interests of parents and their children may be imperfectly aligned.
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Figure 1: The game among adults with informed and naive children
5 Applications
5.1 Attitudes towards sex, hypocrisy, and self-fullling norms
Parental attitudes towards sex are obviously important determinants of the sexual behavior of
children. A direct and obvious channel through which parental attitudes aect child behavior
is the fear of confronting disapproval by one's parent. In this section, we discuss an alternative
channel through which parental attitudes aect their children's sexual behavior. This is an
indirect channel where the parent acts as a vehicle for societal pressures to conform.
Suppose that parents have to decide whether to take a liberal attitude toward sex (a = 1) or
a conservative attitude (a = 0). Taking a conservative attitude involves disapproving of `deviant'
behavior. For concreteness, suppose that this takes the form of stigmatizing youngsters who have
sex before marriage.7 Children in turn choose whether to engage in pre-marital sex ( = 1) or
to abstain ( = 0). Payos are as follows. Engaging in pre-marital sex yields a direct utility
   !(1   x); (13)
where 1 x is the share of adults who take a conservative attitude. The rst term, , represents
the direct net benets (or costs) from pre-marital sex. These clearly reect the direct utility from
the act or from a better informed choice of partner, the quality and availability of contraceptives,
7Note that we are implicitly assuming that parents can commit ex ante to shame future deviant behavior.
This may for instance be done by choosing an appropriate identity (liberal, conservative), in the vein of Akerlof
and Kranton (2000). In that model, dierent identities come with dierent prescriptions of appropriate behavior.
A person with identity A who does not behave in conformity with the behavioral prescriptions appropriate for
A-types would suer a cost (an `identity loss' in Akerlof's and Kranton's terminology). Alternatively (at the
cost of additional expositional complication) we could have constructed a model where dierent parent-child pairs
move sequentially, and where each parent may send a signal to his child by shaming/not shaming deviant children
from the previous cohort.
14the risk of unwanted pregnancies and of sexually transmitted diseases. The second term, !(1 x),
represents the costs of shaming/social boycott coming from society. These increase as more
adults take a conservative attitude toward sex. As in the baseline model, we assume that
children do not observe  when choosing between sex and abstinence.
Parents' direct payo from taking a conservative attitude is set equal to zero. Their direct
expected payo from liberalism reects their assessment of the intrinsic benets/costs of pre-
marital sex, i. We say that an adult has conservative beliefs if, on balance, he thinks that
pre-marital sex is a bad thing (i < 0). We say that an adult has liberal beliefs in the opposite
case (i > 0). We set for simplicity  = 0, so that there is no conict of interest between parent
and child. Our results would simply become more extreme if parents had a bias against pre-
marital sex (for instance because they do not fully internalize the utility the child derives from
the act).8 We also assume that children are naive with probability  < 1. Table 2 illustrates the
parents' overall utility.
Abstinence Pre-marital sex
Conservative attitude 0 [   !(1   x)]
Liberal attitude   + [   !(1   x)]
Table 2: Total parental utility (bold symbols reect parent's utility from the child's choice).
If children were always able to observe x (i.e.  = 0), their choice between sex and abstinence
would be independent of parental attitudes. It is then clear that parents would choose conser-
vatism whenever they have conservative beliefs (i < 0) and would choose liberalism otherwise.
As we now argue, things change when children are (at least in some cases) unable to observe x,
so that norm-signaling occurs.
It is immediate to check that this setup is analogous to the one seen in Section 4 having set
v = rP =  = 0 and rC = l = 1. We can thus apply the result.
Result 1. When  > 0 and D is suciently large, there exists a unique equilibrium where
(i) Parents adopt a liberal attitude if i   = (!=2)(=1 + ), adopt a conservative attitude
otherwise. (ii) Naive children choose pre-marital sex if their parent has a liberal attitude and
choose abstinence (i.e. the socially safe choice) otherwise.
Figure 2 illustrates adults' behavior.
8We consider a setup where parents who fail to shame deviants do not incur any direct sanction themselves.
As a result, we abstract from horizontal complementarities among parents, so that v = 0. This is meant to clarify
that signaling motives alone may be sucient to induce excessive stigmatization.
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Figure 2: Attitudes toward sex
The interesting feature of the model is that some parents may take a conservative attitude
even if they have liberal beliefs, i.e. even when they think that, on balance, pre-marital sex is
a good thing. This is done to signal to their children that pre-marital sex is not acceptable in
society.
Interestingly, for  suciently small, there exist realizations of  such that all parents have
liberal beliefs, but still take a conservative attitude. Even more, it may happen that all parents
know that all other parents have liberal beliefs, but they still choose to be conservative. We call
this feature of the model hypocrisy. Intuitively, the need to signal to children that there is a
norm against pre-marital sex forces parents to follow the norm, thus helping to preserve it. To
see how hypocrisy may occur, suppose that  2 (3;   ). Since all parents have i > 0, they
all have liberal beliefs. However, since  + <  all choose to be conservative. This happens in
spite of the fact that all know that all expect the benet from pre-marital sex to outweigh the
costs. A parent with signal i knows that any other parent necessarily has j  i   2. Hence,
the parent with the lowest signal { equal to     { knows for sure that all other parents have
j     3 > 0. All other parents clearly know that the lowest j is above that level.9
There is evidence to suggest a degree of hypocrisy in parents. Using questionnaire data,
Newcomer and Udry (1985) show that teenagers substantially underestimate their mothers'
liberalism over sex issues. This is consistent with the idea that parents may strategically adopt
a more conservative attitude than their personal inclinations, in order to inuence their children's
behavior.
Finally, notice that hypocrisy decreases as children become less naive (lower ). This suggests
that we should observe less hypocrisy when children are likely to get information from sources
beyond parental control.
9While it is common knowledge that all have liberal beliefs, it is not necessarily common knowledge that all
know that all have liberal beliefs. This would require the stronger condition  > 5. In turn, common knowledge
of the fact that all know that all know that all would benet requires  > 7 and so on.
165.2 Work ethic and collective reputation: Coate and Loury (1992) meets
B enabou and Tirole (2006)
Work ethic has traditionally been on the foreground of much public discourse on welfare and
inequality. Nineteenth-century moralists saw the moral and physical weakness of the poor as
inextricably linked. Contemporary social commentators also lament the \deteriorating work
ethic in white working class males (..)", and identify this deterioration as an important problem
of Western society.10
A point raised by B enabou and Tirole (2006) is that whether a society is perceived as \fair"
or not determines the type of work norms that will prevail.11 Beliefs about the fairness of society
are typically passed by parents onto their children through narratives that do not always reect
the facts on the ground. Understanding the mechanisms through which these beliefs are formed
is thus crucial to understanding what work norms are likely to emerge.
At the same time, a separate line of inquiry has looked at problems of statistical (i.e. in-
formation driven) discrimination (see e.g. Coate and Loury, 1993). These models rely on a
collective reputation mechanism. Since the human capital investment of a worker is imperfectly
observed, employers use stereotypes about the characteristics of workers from the same social
group to form their beliefs. The setup is thus characterized by multiple equilibria. If people
believe that individuals from a certain group are \lazy", each individual group member will
be more reluctant to invest. In turn, this makes it rational for employers to discriminate that
particular group. The extent to which a group will be discriminated thus ultimately depends on
the beliefs about the behavior of its members. A possible shortcoming of these theories is that
they do not provide an account of the beliefs formation process.
We believe that there might be some value in bringing together the two approaches and
that our model may help in this task. We consider a simplied adaptation of Coate and Loury
(1993), which is augmented with an explicit account of belief formation. There is a continuum
of parent-child pairs. Parents choose whether to instil strong or weak work norms into their
children. We model work norms as a commitment to exert eort. Once employed, children
with strong work norms exert high eort, while children with weak work norms exert low eort.
There are two types of jobs: skilled and unskilled. The unskilled job pays w > 0 if the worker
exerts low eort and w+ if he exerts high eort. The skilled job pays the same as the unskilled
10This quote is drawn from an interview with the political scientist and social commentator Charles Murray,
available at http://www.christianpost.com/news/interview-political-scientist-charles-murray-on-class-marriage-
and-the-christian-right-69359/
11See also Piketty (1995, 1998), B enabou and Ok (2001) for other analyses of the role of beliefs on social
mobility.
17Not invest Invest
Weak norms w w + (xw   c)
Strong norms w +  w +  + (xw   c)
Table 3: Total parental utility (bold symbols reect parent's utility from the child's choice).
job plus a skill premium w > 0 (See Table 3). The state of nature  captures the extent to
which eort on the job is rewarded net of its cost. We will interpret it as the incentive system
of society.
Workers can access the skilled job only by investing in skills. The investment costs c > 0,
with c < w, and is imperfectly observed by employers. We assume that if the worker has not
invested, the employer will receive a low signal for sure and allocate the worker to the unskilled
job. If the worker has invested, the employer will observe a high signal (and allocate the worker
to the skilled job) with probability x, where x is the aggregate share of workers with strong
work norms in the group. With the complementary probability, 1   x, the employer receives a
low signal and allocates the worker to the unskilled job.
An interesting feature of this setup is that oblique complementarities arise indirectly, from
the collective reputation mechanism. An employer is more likely to notice that a worker is skilled
if the worker belongs to a group with high work ethic. Hence, employers partly form their beliefs
based on aggregate information { namely stereotypes about the pervasiveness (or lack thereof)
of work ethic in the group. This implies that, if the group is perceived as lacking work ethic, each
worker will face worse job prospects (even if he has invested), and vice-versa. Just as in Coate
and Loury (1993), these stereotypes will prove to be relevant since in equilibrium a group's work
ethic actually reects its aggregate level of human capital.
Since parents' choices of work norms are correlated { they all depend on the net return from
eort  { a child's own work norm is a good indicator of the work norms of other group members
and, accordingly, of whether it is worth to invest in skills. Hence, work norms have a dual role
in our setting. First, they determine the level of eort exerted by children. Second, they shape
children's beliefs about the chances that investing in skills will be rewarded. A child with a
strong work norm not only exerts higher eort once he gets a job, he is also more inclined to
invest in order to land a better job. In turn, this implies that stereotypes on a group's work
ethic are informative about the group's human capital investment.
This setup is equivalent to that of the baseline model if we set rC = c=w, ! = w and
 = 0. It follows that,
Result 2. When  > 0, and D is suciently large, there exists a unique equilibrium where (i)
18Parents instill a strong work norm in their child if i    c   w=2, and a weak work norm
otherwise. (ii) Children with strong work norms invest in skills, while children with weak norms
do not.
The result has implications both for socio-economic theories of work ethic and for theories
of information-based discrimination. In the absence of signaling concerns a parent would give
his child a weak work norm if and only if he expects a negative net return from eort (i  0).
In the presence of signaling, it is necessary to distinguish between two cases. We say that a
group lives in a low mobility environment if access to education is costly relative to the skill
premium (c > w=2, or, equivalently, rC = c=w > 1=2). We say that it lives in a high mobility
environment if the reverse occurs. Since rC > 1=2, in a low mobility environment, not investing
in skills is the socially safe choice. A parent may thus choose a weak work norm even if the net
return from eort is positive. Intuitively, the parent expects that, since other children of the
group will lack work ethic, his child will be at a disadvantage. A weak work norm is optimal
because it signals to the child that he should not waste resources in trying to climb the social
ladder. This implies that weak work norms may persist even when incentives (e.g. the benet
system) are designed to make eort protable. By contrast, in a highly mobile environment,
investing is socially safe. Strong work norms may thus persist even in the presence of poorly
designed incentives that favor low eort.
Notice that a child with a strong work norm has a positive outlook on society and its fairness.
He expects that investing in skill will ultimately be rewarded. In the terminology of Benabou
and Tirole (2006), he believes in a \just world". By converse a child with a weak work norm
expects discrimination to be rife. Hence, at the micro level, the model highlights that the work
norms one inherits from his family background are important determinants of beliefs. At the
aggregate level, the beliefs of a group (and thus its chances of social advancement) will ultimately
be determined by the interaction between its perception of the incentive system (), and other
characteristics of the environment like the accessibility of the education system vis- a-vis the skill
premium.
5.3 Boy scouts and hoods: Trust, values, and crime
A large body of work spanning psychology and economics challenges the assumption that in-
dividuals act exclusively to maximize their narrowly-dened self-interest. Evidence shows that
individuals often reduce their own earnings in order to increase the earnings of their opponent,
even in situations where there are no positive future consequences associated with behaving
pro-socially (see, e.g., Camerer 2003). A related question is why we observe parents passing
19pro-social values to their children even in societies that, because of a weak or inecient legal
system, appear not to reward pro-social behavior or even to encourage opportunism. Shedding
light on this puzzle is relevant because pro-social norms are often all that prevents societies char-
acterized by weak or corrupt governance from unravelling. At the same time, recent economic
literature on crime raises the opposite puzzle (see e.g. Silverman, 2004). Why do we observe
anti-social behavior even in environments where this is manifestly sub-optimal? We argue here
that pro-social values have hidden benets and costs, which may help to shed light on these
puzzles.
The crucial observation, borrowed form Adriani and Sonderegger (2009), is that, by instilling
pro-social values into his child, a parent may signal that a norm for honesty is dominant in society.
Equipped with the knowledge that honest individuals are the majority, the child then nds it
optimal to trust others. By contrast, a child that is raised with anti-social values will infer that
dishonesty is rife among his contemporaries, and will therefore not trust.
The setup is as follows. Each child can behave either in a trusting or distrustful manner. He
can also be either honest or dishonest. Trusting yields a material payo tx   q(1   x), where
x is the share of honest children and (1   x) the share of dishonest children. Hence, t > 0 is
the marginal benet of an additional honest individual and q > 0 is the marginal cost of an
additional dishonest individual. The payo from being distrustful is set equal to zero.
Consider now the rewards from honesty and dishonesty. Again, we set the payo from
honesty equal to zero. The payo from dishonesty is b   , where  2 [0;1] is the share of
trusting individuals. We assume that b > 0, so that the rewards from dishonesty increase with
the share of trusting individuals. Intuitively, a larger share of trusting individuals means a
larger pool of potential victims. The state of nature  can be interpreted as the extent to which
the institutional environment punishes or rewards dishonesty. This may for instance reect the
quality of governance, the legal system, or the eectiveness of enforcement.
We assume that children do not observe , nor x or . Parents observe a private signal i
about  and choose whether to give pro-social or anti-social values to their child. A child with
pro-social (anti-social) values is committed to honesty (dishonesty).12 The child can however
choose whether to trust or not. Table 4 illustrates the payos.
The question we ask is the following. Under what conditions, if any, would a parent want
to raise his child as pro-social? In the absence of signaling motives, parents may want to give
pro-social values only when the consequences of dishonesty () are negative enough to counteract
12Notice however that this would be consistent with the child's equilibrium behavior so long as  is unobservable.
We assume commitment to keep exposition simple and to make the setup comparable with what we have seen in
the previous sections.
20Trusting Distrustful
Pro-social values (tx   (1   x)q) 0
Anti-social values b    + (tx   (1   x)q) b   
Table 4: Total parental utility (bold symbols reect parent's utility from the child's choice).
the material advantages (b). It is then clear that no parent with i < 0, i.e. believing that
dishonesty pays, will ever pass pro-social values to his child.13
Consider now what happens in this setup if we introduce norm signaling. We argue that,
if the potential rewards from trust are suciently large, so that t > b + q, a parent may raise
his child as pro-social even if he believes that the institutional environment rewards dishonesty
( < 0). Symmetrically, if t < b + q, a parent may raise his child as anti-social even when
dishonesty is suboptimal. The rst step is to establish that, in equilibrium, the share of honest
children must coincide with the share of trusting children.
Lemma 1. Assume that  > 0. Then, for D is suciently large  = x in any equilibrium of the
game.
Proof. See Appendix.
Notice now that, since all individual players are small, there is no loss of generality in
imposing  = x at the outset. It is convenient to work directly with these \reduced form"
payos. The inclusive payo from pro-social values is thus
 (bx   ) + [(t + q)x   q]  :
Forgone dishonesty Utility from
rents trusting
(14)
Setting v =  b, ! = t + q, rC = q=(t + q),  = l = rP = 0,  = 1, and  =   shows
that the \reduced form" setup is analogous to that of Section 4. A peculiar feature of this
setting deserves special attention, though. Since b > 0, we have v < 0. In words, parental
actions (to raise their child as pro-social/anti-social) are strategic substitutes. Intuitively, since
(in equilibrium) pro-social children are trusting, a parent's choice to raise his child as pro-social
increases the stock of trusting children. In turn, this increases the expected rents obtained
13Formally, if children could observe the share of pro-social agents x, a child's choice to be trusting or not would
be independent of his values. A child will be trusting if the proportion of pro-social individuals is suciently
large (x  q=(q+t)) and will not trust otherwise. Consider now parents. If they choose to endow their child with
pro-social values their child cannot benet from dishonesty. This costs b   . Hence, the expected net payo
from passing pro-social values of a parent with private signal i is i   bE(ji):
21from dishonesty, thus weakening the incentives, for other parents, to raise their children as pro-
social. This setup is thus characterized by horizontal substitutability. In order to ensure that
Assumption A1 (supermodularity of inclusive payo) is satised, we need to impose t + q > b.
Result 3. Assume that  > 0, D is suciently large, and t+q > b. Then, there exists a unique
equilibrium where (i) Parents choose pro-social values for their children if i   = (q+b t)=2
and choose anti-social values otherwise. (ii) Children choose to be trusting if and only if they
are pro-social.
Notice that, for t > q, rC < 1=2. Thus, trusting is the socially safe choice. If the potential
rewards from trusting are large enough (t > q +b), the norm signaling bias generates a negative
cuto ( < 0). As a result, there exist i < 0 such that parents want to pass pro-social values
to his child even if dishonesty appears to be materially optimal (bx    > 0). They do this to
signal that they are optimistic about the share of honest individuals in society, so that their child
will trust. Since other parents do the same, the honesty norm becomes self-fullling and the
actual rewards from trusting outweigh the forgone rents from dishonesty. For t < q, rC > 1=2,
so that the socially safe choice is not to trust. As a result, the cuto is always strictly positive.
In this case, a \street culture" may emerge, whereby parents instil anti-social values even when
dishonesty does not pay (i.e. bx    < 0). Again, the reason they do this is to signal that
trusting others is a bad idea. Since other parents reason in a similar way, this prophecy becomes
self-fullling.
Adriani and Sonderegger (2009) study this problem in a setup with homogenous beliefs and
nd that there is a continuum of equilibria where parents choose pro-social values for their
children. Compared to AS, the present setup does away with indeterminacy, delivering clear
comparative statics. The unique equilibrium prediction ( = (q + b   t)=2) implies that the
parents' propensity to raise their children as pro-social depends not only on the marginal benet
from dishonesty b, which is somehow expected, but also on the marginal benets and costs from
trusting (t and q). This is a byproduct of the fact that the decision of being trusting or not
depends on the beliefs about the ethical values of others, which in turn are determined { through
parental signaling { by one's ethical values. This generates a connection between the returns
from participating in economic exchange and the distribution of pro-social preferences in the
population.
6 Norm-signaling and multiple equilibria
This section discusses interesting cases where the model may generate multiple equilibria.
226.1 Children's peer eects, intergenerational conicts, and sexual revolutions
In some applications, it may be reasonable to assume that children are more concerned with co-
ordinating with other children, rather than with adults. Recent history is littered with examples
of rebellious youth subcultures, which openly challenge the mainstream adult society. In the
Western world, intergenerational conict possibly reached the highest intensity in the 60s. This
decade led to profound changes in social norms. One of the most striking social phenomena of
that period is the so called sexual revolution. In this section we sketch what might happen in our
setup when children are not interested in conforming to adults but only care about coordinating
with their peers.
Consider again the \sex attitudes" application seen in Section 5.1. Suppose that parents'
inclusive payo from liberalism is unchanged,
 +   [   !(1   x)]:
Parent's direct utility Parental perception of
from liberalism child's utility from sex
(15)
The second term represents the parent's perception of the child's payo from pre-marital sex.
Assume now that, dierent from the case seen before, the child's actual payo does not reect
the second term in (15). The child does not care about the direct consequences of pre-marital
sex or about social stigma from adults, but is instead only interested in coordinating with his
peers. His net payo from pre-marital sex ( = 1) is thus
C(X)  X   rC; rC 2 (0;1); (16)
where X 2 [0;1] is the share of children who choose pre-marital sex. His payo from abstinence
is zero. He thus chooses pre-marital sex whenever he expects X to be larger than rC. Notice that
this conict of interests between a parent and his child cannot be fully captured by a constant
parameter, so that the results of Section 4 do not apply here.14 We assume that the existence
of this conict of interests is common knowledge. Parents know that children maximize (16),
children know that parents know, and so on.
This setup generates multiple equilibria. There exist for instance equilibria where children
do not pay attention to parents and coordinate on either of the two actions independently of
what they observe their parents doing. Clearly enough,  = 0 in these cases. This implies
that there is no norm signaling bias and therefore no hypocrisy.
There also exist, however, more interesting equilibria where children use parental actions
as a coordinating device, so that  6= 0. We say that there is a norm for intergenerational
14The conict of interest is measured by the dierence  !(1 x) X+rc and thus depends on the endogenous
variables x and X.
23harmony if  > 0. Symmetrically, we say that there is a norm for intergenerational conict if
 < 0. It is clear that in the case of intergenerational harmony all the results of Section 5.1
(including hypocrisy) would apply. Under intergenerational conict, however, a parent choosing
a conservative attitude increases the chances that his child will engage in pre-marital sex. For
parameter values, equilibria with intergenerational conict exist and are characterized by adults
adopting a negative cuto.15 This implies that even parents with moderately conservative beliefs
will now take a liberal attitude. In other words, we have hypocrisy in reverse. Notice that
adults still want their child to choose what they perceive as the socially safe choice (abstinence).
However, the presence of intergenerational conict implies that they need to adopt a relaxed
attitude toward sex to achieve this.
In general, it is clear that intergenerational harmony promotes hypocrisy whereas a dose
of intergenerational conict may reduce it or even generate reverse hypocrisy. This suggests
that it might not be by chance that the sexual revolution was brought about by a period of
extraordinary intergenerational conict.
6.2 Costless communication in parent-child relationships
It is almost a platitude to observe that, in parent-child relationships, actions speak louder than
words. A parent that does not practice what he preaches often loses credibility in the eyes
of his child. Applied to our context, this implies, for instance, that a liberal parent would
have a hard time getting his child to conform to conservative values he does not subscribe to
himself. This emerges endogenously, as a feature of the signaling equilibrium. Upon observing
his parent taking a liberal attitude, a child rationally infers that society at large is unlikely to
be predominantly conservative.
A possible objection to our setup is that it does not explicitly allow parents to use other
methods except their own actions to transmit information to children. What might happen if
we allow for direct (and possibly costless) communication between parents and children?
It is clear that, in the absence of oblique complementarities, allowing for cheap talk would
never eliminate the conict of interests component of the distortion. However, since the norm
signaling component does not arise from a conict of interests, it is fair to ask whether it might
disappear if we allowed for costless communication. We oer two remarks on this. First, at
a very informal level, we suspect that once a society has settled on an equilibrium without
15For instance, if  is not too large relative to , there exists a continuum of equilibria where sophisticated
children choose sex whenever x < x
, with x
 2 [1   rC=;(1   rC)=], and choose abstinence for x  x
. Naive
children choose sex if and only if their parent takes a conservative attitude. Adults follow a threshold equilibrium
with cuto equal to  !=2(1   ) < 0.
24communication, it might be quite dicult for parental cheap talk to destabilize it. Consider for
instance a parental deviation consisting in choosing the low action and giving instructions to
the child to choose the top action. For this to work, the child needs to hold conicting beliefs
about his parent. First, he has to believe that his parent is fairly representative of the adult
population (otherwise there is no point in paying attention to what he does or says in the rst
place). However, he also needs to believe that his parent is somewhat special (i.e. the deviation
is truly unilateral). If the child suspects that other parents might behave like his own, his
incentive to choose the top action will be small.
There is another, point though. So long as a conict of interests is present, a norm-signaling
bias will characterize all equilibria of the game. Intuitively, if the parent could use cheap talk
to avoid the distortion due to norm signaling, he would use it also to avoid the distortion due
to the conict of interests. In other words, if the parent could \talk" his child into choosing a
particular action, he would exploit communication to deceive the child when their interests are
misaligned.
We now formalize this insight. Consider our baseline model augmented with cheap talk. We
want to check whether there exist equilibria where the only distortion is due to the conict of
interest (i.e. equilibria with cuto ^  =  ) even when !(rC  1=2) 6= 0. Suppose rst that both
 > 0 and !(rC   1=2) < 0, so that the conict of interests component and the norm signaling
component reinforce each other (they both take the form of the parent wanting the child to
select the top action). Consider a candidate equilibrium where parents take the high action if
and only if i  ^  (see Figure 3.A).
j
  + !(rC   1=2)
j
^  =  
j
0
i
(A)
j
^  =  
j
0
j
  + !(rC   1=2)
i
(B)
Figure 3: Costless communication
Clearly enough, parents with i < ^  choose the low action. Those parents for whom i is
suciently close to ^  also send a message to their children instructing them to choose the top
action. This is because these parents have posteriors beliefs that are very close to those of
25the marginal parent, and thus want their child to take the socially safe action (which in this
case is the top action, since rC < 1=2). These instructions must be followed by the children
in equilibrium, or else these parents would prefer to switch to the high action. On the other
hand, this cannot be consistent with the postulated equilibrium. If the child were to follow the
instructions, the parent would nd it optimal to choose the low action and send the message
whenever i < 0 (i.e. including for some signals i > ^ ). Intuitively, if the child were to believe
the message, the parent would take advantage of this and use the message to mislead the child
in situations where he wants the child to take the top action but the child prefers the bottom
action. Consider now the case where  > 0 but !(rC   1=2) > 0, so that the conict of interest
and the norm signaling bias partially oset each other (Figure 3.B). In this case, the socially safe
action for the child is the bottom action. Suppose that ^  =  . For i > ^  but suciently close
to ^ , parents select the high action and send a message to their child to take the bottom action {
this is because these parents have posteriors that are very close to those of the marginal parent,
and thus want their child to take the socially safe action. Notice however that, abstracting
from signaling concerns, these parents actually prefer the low action. The only reason why they
might want to choose the high action is to induce their child to choose the top action. It follows
that this cannot be an equilibrium. These parents would clearly benet from switching to the
low action.16 Intuitively, by sending the message, parents are \undoing" what they are trying
to achieve by choosing the high action. Clearly enough, a symmetric argument applies to the
case where  < 0. Cheap talk may possibly eliminate the norm signaling component only in the
special case where the interests of parents and children are perfectly aligned ( = 0).
Summing up, so long as a conict of interest is present, norm signaling will matter indepen-
dently of whether costless communication is allowed or not.
7 Concluding Remarks
Many models of culture emphasize how societies may endogenously value some personal charac-
teristics or activities beyond their intrinsic economic value (see e.g. Cole et al. 1992, Fang, 2001,
Mailath and Postlewaite, 2006). One question that these models are not designed to tackle is
why some activities end up being overvalued while others do not. For instance, is there anything
inherently special in an Oxford accent? Addressing this problem in a theoretically compelling
way (i.e. without assuming the result) is of course extremely dicult. While our paper does not
16Interestingly, when the two distortions go in opposite directions and the norm signaling bias is larger than
the conict of interest, there exist cheap talk equilibria where no distortion arises, i.e. ^  = 0. In other words, the
norm signaling distortion totally compensates for the conict of interests.
26provide a direct answer to the question, it nevertheless contributes an intermediate step that
may prove useful in answering it. The very nature of the process of cultural transmission im-
plies that whether an activity is socially safe or not may shape attitudes towards that particular
activity. While in some cases dierent activities may be perfectly symmetric (e.g. driving on
the left or on the right), our applications suggest that, generally, an asymmetry will be present.
In these cases, the criterion of social safety allows to identify a precise activity. Our theory
suggests that society will be more likely to display a favorable attitude towards that activity.
Understanding the conditions that make an activity socially safe/unsafe could thus provide a
valuable clue to understanding which activities might be valued beyond their intrinsic economic
worth.
8 Appendix
8.1 Preliminaries
Before starting, we determine several statistics, distributions, and probabilities that will be used
throughout the proofs. First, standard results imply that E(jji) = E(ji) = i. Consider now
the share of adults in the population whose private signal exceeds a threshold k, i.e. parents
with i  k . Denote with xk 2 [0;1] this share. We need to determine the following conditional
expectations
1. given a realization  of the state of nature, E(xkj);
2. given a realization i of adult i's private signal, E(xkji);
3. given i and a real number s, E(xkji < s) and E(xkji > s).
Standard arguments imply that the expected value of xk conditional on  is
E(xkj) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
1 if   k + 
1=2 +  k
2 if k    <  < k + 
0 if   k   
(17)
In order to determine E(xkji), we need the conditional distribution of adult j signal condi-
tional on the realization of adult i's signal, i.e. jji. This is
27f(jji) =
8
> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :
0 if j  i + 2
i+2 j
32 if i + 2 > j  i + 
1
3 if i +  > j > i   
j i+2
32 if i     j > i   2
0 if j  i   2
(18)
Although this is also relatively standard, we sketch the argument. The area below f(jji)
consists in a trapezoid. The trapezoid is composed of a rectangle with base given by the interval
[i   ;i + ], i.e. 2 in length, and height d to be determined, plus two triangles each with
height d. The left triangle has base dened over the interval [i   2;i   ], the right triangle
over the interval [i + ;i + 2]. Hence, each triangle has base of length . The total area must
be equal to one. Hence, 2d + 2d=2 = 1, which yields d = 1=3.
Endowed with f(jji), it is then easy to determine E(xkji) =
R k
i 2 f(jji)dj
E(xkji) =
8
> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :
1 if i  k + 2
1  
(i 2 k)2
62 if k + 2 > i  k + 
1=2 + i k
3 if k +  > i > k   
(i+2 k)2
62 if k     i > k   2
0 if i  k   2
(19)
For i   2  k, xk = 1 with certainty. For i + 2  k, xk = 0 with certainty. For
i + 2 > k > i   2, E(xkji) is given by the total area of the trapezoid to the right of k.
We also need to determine, for a real number s, E(xkji < s) and E(xkji > s). To this
purpose, we need the unconditional (prior) density of i, f(i), and the unconditional (prior)
cumulative F(i). Consider f rst. Again, the area below f(i) consists in a trapezoid composed
by a rectangle with base given by the interval [ D;D] (of length 2D) and height h (to be
determined) and two triangles also of height h. The left triangle has base dened by the interval
( D   ; D). The right triangle has base dened by the interval (D;D + ). Hence, both
triangles have base equal to  and height h. Since the total area must be one, it follows that
h = 1=(2D + ). Then, simple calculations show that
f(i) =
8
> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :
0 if i  D + 
D+ i
(2D+) if D +  > i > D
1
2D+ if D  i   D
i+D+
(2D+) if  D > i >  D   
0 if i   D   
(20)
28Consider now the cumulative prior F. This is given by
F(s) = Pr(i < s) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
1 if s  D + 
1
2D+
h

2 + s + D  
(s D)2
2
i
if D +  > s > D
1
2D+
 
2 + s + D

if D  s   D
1
2D+
h
(s+D+)2
2
i
if  D > s >  D   
0 if s   D   
(21)
Then, for s  k   2, E(xkji < s) = 0. For s > k   2, we have instead
E(xkji < s) =
Z s
k 2
E(xkji)f(i)di

1
F(s)
: (22)
By using a symmetric approach, one obtains E(xkji > s) = 1 for s  k + 2 and
E(xkji > s) =

1   F(k + 2) +
Z k+2
s
E(xkji)f(i)di

1
1   F(s)
; (23)
for s < k+2. In what follows, we will often make use of the limit of E(xkji < s) and E(xkji >
s) for D ! 1. Notice that, for s and q > s nite, limD!1 F(s) = limD!1 F(q) = 1=2 and
limD!1
R q
s E(xkji)f(i)di = [limD!1
1
2D+]
R q
s E(xkji)di = 0. Hence,
lim
D!1
E(xkji < s) = 0 (24)
and
lim
D!1
E(xkji > s) = 1: (25)
8.2 Proof of the main result (Proposition 1)
We give the proof for the slightly more general result stated in Section 4. It is clear that the
statement in Proposition 1 is a special case of that once we set  = 1 and l = v = 0. The proof
is structured in the following way. We keep xed the equilibrium behavior of those children
who directly observe x (sophisticated children) and solve for the equilibrium behavior of adults
and of those children who only observe their parent's action (naive children). This is clearly
without loss of generality. The next two results (Lemmata 2 and 3) are useful to derive (for D
suciently large) the equilibrium value of  for naive children. We then turn to the adults
and, subsequently, characterize the behavior of sophisticated children.
Intermediate results on the equilibrium strategy of naive children
Lemma 2. In any equilibrium, 1) limD!1 E(ja = 1) = 1 and limD!1 E(ja = 0) =  1; 2)
limD!1 E(xja = 1) = 1 and limD!1 E(xja = 0) = 0.
29Fix an equilibrium. Given l < 1, there always exist D so large that, for extreme realizations
of i, either action is dominant for the parent independently of the child's response. Let 1 denote
the inmum of the set of realizations of i for which playing a = 1 is strictly dominant and let
0 be the supremum of the set for which playing a = 1 is strictly dominated. It is then clear
that
E(ja = 1)  E(ji > 0) (26)
E(ja = 0)  E(ji < 1) (27)
Notice that, necessarily, 0 and 1 are independent of D. It is then immediate to verify that
limD!1 E(ji > 0) = 1 and limD!1 E(ji < 1) =  1, which is sucient for statement
1). Let us now focus on the second statement. Consider two alternative strategy proles for
parents. In the rst, parent i follows his equilibrium strategy, but all parents j 6= i use a
threshold strategy with cuto at 1. In the second, i sticks to his equilibrium strategy, but all
the other adults use a cuto 0. Denote with X i(1) and X i(0) the realized values of x under
these two proles { the subscript  i refers to the fact that all adults except i use cuto 1 or
0. Clearly, it must be that
E(X i(1)jai)  E(xjai)  E(X i(0)jai): (28)
In words, keeping xed the information content of parent i's strategy, the child's expectation of
x in equilibrium must exceed the expectation he would have if all parents j 6= i were playing
action a = 1 only when it were strictly dominant. Symmetrically, the child's expectation of x
cannot exceed the expectation he would have if all parents j 6= i were playing action a = 1
whenever it is not strictly dominated. The rest of the proof of the Lemma consists in showing
that both the upper and lower bound for E(xjai) in (28) converge to one (zero) for ai = 1
(ai = 0).
Denote with i(a)  [ D   ;D + ] the set of realizations of i for which parent i plays
a in equilibrium and with D(a)  i(a) the subset of realizations for which playing action a
is strictly dominant. Clearly enough, D(0) = [ D   ;0) and D(1) = (1;D + ]. Let also xk
denote the realized value of x when all parents (including i) use cuto k. Note that
E(X i(0)ja) = E(X i(0)ji 2 i(a)) = E(x0ji 2 i(a)) (29)
E(X i(1)ja) = E(X i(1)ji 2 i(a)) = E(x1ji 2 i(a)): (30)
The rst equality in (29) and (30) comes from the child updating his beliefs using the parent's
equilibrium strategy. The second equality follows from the weight of parent i's action in the
30aggregated level of x being zero. The last terms in (29) and (30) can be decomposed into,
E(x0ji 2 i(a)) =
P(D(a))
P(i(a))E(x0ji 2 D(a)) +
h
1  
P(D(a))
P(i(a))
i
E(x0ji 2 i(a) n D(a))
E(x1ji 2 i(a)) =
P(D(a))
P(i(a))E(x1ji 2 D(a)) +
h
1  
P(D(a))
P(i(a))
i
E(x1ji 2 i(a) n D(a))
:
(31)
where P(S) denotes the probability that i 2 S. Clearly enough,
E(xkji 2 D(1)) = E(xkji > 1); and
E(xkji 2 D(0)) = E(xkji < 0): (32)
From (24) and (25), E(xkji > 1) converges to one for D ! 1, while E(xkji < 0) converges
to zero. Moreover, P(i(a)) = P(i(a) n D(a)) + P(D(a)). Given i(a) n D(a)  [0;1], we
have P(i(a) n D(a))  F(1)   F(0), where F is the cumulative prior distribution of i given
in (21). Using P(D(0)) = F(0) and P(D(1)) = 1   F(1) we therefore have
P(D(1))
P(i(1))

1   F(1)
1   F(0)
(33)
and
P(D(0))
P(i(0))

F(0)
F(1)
: (34)
From (21), the RHS of both (33) and (34) converges to one as D ! 1. Then, taking the limit
in (31) we obtain
lim
D!1
E(X i(0)ja = 1) = lim
D!1
E(X i(1)ja = 1) = 1 (35)
and
lim
D!1
E(X i(0)ja = 0) = lim
D!1
E(X i(1)ja = 0) = 0: (36)
The Lemma is then proved by taking the limit in (28).
Consider now the equilibrium strategy of naive children. A strategy for a naive child maps
the parent's action space f0;1g into the set of probability distributions over f0;1g. As seen in
the text, a naive child's strategy can be summarized for our purposes by the variable ,
Lemma 3. If D is suciently large, then, in any equilibrium of the game,  = 1 for naive
children.
Consider a child's expected net payo from the top action conditional on his parent's action
E[C(x;)ja] = ![E(xja)   rC] + lE(ja): (37)
Notice that the rst term is bounded above by !(1 rC) and below by  !rC. Whenever l > 0,
 = 1 follows from statement 1) of Lemma 2. The only other possible case is l = 0. However,
Lemma 2 implies that limD!1 E[C(x)ja = 1] = !(1   rC) > 0 and limD!1 E[C(x)ja = 0] =
 !rC < 0. As a result,  = 1.
31Proof of the main result
Given the characterization of naive children's equilibrium strategies for D large, we now turn our
attention to the strategies of parents. Given  = 1 for naive children, the expected inclusive
payo from the high action for parent i can be written as
(x;i) = (v + !)E(xji) + (1 + l)i   A; (38)
where A  vrP + !rC   .
Let (xk;i) denote the expected net payo from selecting the high action of a parent i
observing i when all other parents follow a threshold strategy with cuto k. From (17), xk is
equal to one if  > k + , is zero if  < k    and is equal to
xk =
1
2
+
   k
2
(39)
otherwise. A parent with signal i assigns positive probability only to signals j such that
maxfi  2; D g  j  minfi +2;D+g. As a result, for signal realizations i  k+2,
xk = 1 for sure, while, for i  k   2, xk = 0 for sure. Hence, the derivative of E(xkji) is
zero outside the interval i 2 (k   2;k + 2). Suppose now that k 2 [ D + 3;D   3]. Clearly
enough, i 2 (k 2;k+2) implies i 2 [D ;D+]. As a result, ji is uniformly distributed
in the interval [i   ;i + ]. This implies that, for i 2 (k   2;k + 2)
d
di
E(xkji) =

i +    k
2
 
i      k
2

1
2
> 0: (40)
Hence E(xkji) is non-increasing in i. Given v +!  0 (Assumption A1), this in turn implies
that (x;i) is strictly increasing. Moreover,
E(xkjk) =
Z k+
k 

1
2
+
   k
2

1
2
d =
Z 1
0
udu =
1
2
: (41)
The equilibrium cuto  is thus found by solving


1
2
;

= 0 (42)
which yields expression (10) for . Finally, since (10) is independent of D, then it is clear that
there exists D suciently large that  2 [ D + 3;D   3].
Hence, for D large, a strategy prole where all adults use a cuto  is consistent with
equilibrium behavior. We now show that, for D suciently large, no other equilibrium is possible.
To this purpose, we will follow Morris and Shin (1998). Fix an equilibrium and let (i) denote
the probability that a parent i observing i chooses a = 1. Let also
  inffij(i) > 0g; (43)
32  supfij(i) < 1g: (44)
No parent with i <  chooses a = 1 with positive probability and no parent with i > 
chooses a = 0 with positive probability. Clearly enough, if we can prove that  =  = ,
then the equilibrium where all parents use cuto  must be the only equilibrium. Notice that
  supfij1 > (i) > 0g  inffij1 > (i) > 0g  . Hence,   . We now show that
    .
If (i) < 1, it must be that (x;i)  0. By continuity, this has to hold for i = . Hence,
we have
(x;;)  0: (45)
Consider now the expected net payo from choosing a = 1 under a strategy prole such that
all other parents use a threshold strategy with cuto  and children follow their equilibrium
strategy (summarized by  = 1). Then, for D suciently large, it must be that
0  (x;)  (x;) (46)
where the rst inequality comes from (45) and the second inequality comes from the fact that
E(xj) cannot be lower than E(xj).
A symmetric argument for  reveals
0  (x;)  (x:) (47)
Given that (xk;k) is continuous and strictly increasing and is zero for k = , (46) and (47)
imply    and    respectively. Since we have already shown that   , then  =  = .
To conclude the characterization of the equilibrium, consider sophisticated children. (No-
tice that the above results apply given any equilibrium behavior of sophisticated children). A
strategy for a sophisticated child maps the set [0;1] of possible realizations of x into the set of
probability distributions over the child's action space f0;1g. It is clear that these children will
choose the top action whenever
!(x   rC) + lE(jx)  0 (48)
and will choose the bottom action otherwise. Given that adults follow the threshold strat-
egy described above, the LHS of (48) is strictly increasing in x. As a result, the behavior of
sophisticated children is uniquely determined.

338.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose by contradiction that  > x. Then, some children with anti-social values are choosing
to be trusting. This implies that, for some child, the expectation of x conditional on his parent's
choosing anti-social values must be at least equal to q=(t + q) > 0. However, we have already
established (see Lemma 2) that that conditional expectation converges to zero as D goes to
innity. As a result, for D suciently large, the conditional expectation is lower than q=(t+q),
which contradicts our premise. Symmetrically,  < x implies that, for some child, the expectation
of x conditional on his parent choosing pro-social values must be lower than or equal to q=(t+q) <
1. However, since the conditional expectation converges to one, we have a contradiction. Hence,
there always exists D suciently large such that  = x in any equilibrium of the game.

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